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THE SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE: 
THE CULMINATION OF THREE 
DECADES OF CONFLICTING 
REGULATION, DEREGULATION, 
AND RE-REGULATION 
Abstract: The role of the public accounting profession in the savings 
and loan debacle of the 1980s has recently been the subject of Con-
gressional inquiry and extensive litigation by government agencies, 
and by angry stockholders and bondholders. These efforts suggest a 
broad misunderstanding by the public of the causes of the disaster. 
this paper illustrates that the difficulties which precipitated the crisis 
were a result of the historical development of the regulatory environ-
ment of the savings and loan industry. Examining this regulatory 
environment helps in understanding the current problems and crises 
of savings and loans as well as the situation in which the accounting 
profession now finds itself. 
The paper illustrates that the manner in which the industry was 
regulated, including piecemeal and often conflicting legislation, 
locked the industry into long-term mortgage commitments and then 
urged diversification from these commitments. The paper illustrates 
that, over the years, industry responses to this legislation created a 
net worth crisis. The extent of the crisis was obscured by accounting 
principles developed by regulators, and which ran contrary to GAAP. 
Finally, the paper discusses recent legislation designed to correct the 
regulatory and accounting inconsistencies, and the anticipated effect 
of this legislation on the future of the savings and loan industry. 
The end of the 1980s decade was marred by the financial 
collapse of many savings and loan institutions. Current esti-
mates of federal expenditures necessary to bail out the savings 
and loan industry from its financial debacle generally exceed 
$100 billion and some estimates range as high as $300 billion 
[Adams, 1990, p. 17; Pilzer, 1989, p. 233]. When interest costs 
on 30 to 40 year debt used to finance the federal bailout are 
included, cost estimates rise steeply to between $500 billion and 
$1 trillion [Carlton, 1992]. The "true" cost of the bailout will not 
be known for years to come, until all of the failing institutions 
have been shut down, merged, and sold off; until the Resolution 
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Trust Corporation liquidates its holdings; and until all of the tax 
breaks and special portfolio performance guarantees granted to 
acquiring institutions have expired. Meanwhile, the American 
public is still asking: how the fiasco came about; who should be 
blamed for it; and how the clean up should be financed. 
These are questions of particular concern for accountants 
for the following reason. While the responsibility for the wide-
spread failure in the industry has not yet been fully determined, 
the role of the public accounting profession as well as the ac-
counting standards, principles, procedures, and rules for sav-
ings and loan financial reporting have been called into question. 
Auditors of failed savings and loans have been shouldering part 
of the blame for the fiasco and some of the financial responsi-
bility for the clean up, as a result of various lawsuits by federal 
agencies.1 In addition, auditors have been subjected to various 
class action lawsuits brought by investors in failed savings and 
loans.2 These lawsuits, whether justified or not, reflect a myopic 
perspective of how the debacle occurred. The thrift debacle was 
not simply the result of audit irregularities, Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board forbearance in closing troubled institutions, or 
fraud and mismanagement by thrift industry executives. Al-
though each of these factors contributed substantially to the 
crisis, the problem was also fundamentally rooted in the histori-
cal regulation of the industry. 
This paper discusses, from a historical perspective, the 
regulatory environment of the savings and loan industry. Exam-
ining this regulatory history helps in understanding the current 
1By April 1986, 38 investigations had been launched by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and $3,319,000 had been turned over to the FDIC 
by various auditors [U.S. General Accounting Office, 1986]. The Resolution 
Trust Corporation (the agency designated to dispose of the assets of failed sav-
ings and loans) has recently filed suits against the following CPA firms for their 
roles in failed savings institutions: KPMG Peat Marwick, $154 million; Deloitte 
and Touche, $444 million; Pannell Kerr Forster, $41 million [Pickering, 1992]. 
Ernst and Young agreed to a total comprehensive settlement of $400 million. 
This agreement was reached with the federal thrift regulations to resolve all 
"current and potential claims" against the firm for its role in audits of failed 
depository institutions [Eldridge, 1992]. 
2Recently Ernst and Young agreed to pay a total of $63 million to settle a 
class action lawsuit related to failed Lincoln Savings and Loan [Stevens, 1992, p. 
A3]. In addition to this settlement, Ernst and Young agreed to pay the Resolu-
tion Trust Corporation $41 million [Public Accounting Report, 1992]. Arthur 
Andersen has also paid a total of $30 million to bondholders of Lincoln Savings 
and Loan [Public Accounting Report, 1992]. 
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problems and crises of savings and loans as well as the situation 
in which the accounting profession now finds itself. The paper 
illustrates how changes in regulations and conflicting regulatory 
intentions laid the framework for the savings and loan debacle. 
Finally, this paper calls for greater coordination of Congres-
sional goals for savings and loans, and the financial services 
industry, as the only way to achieve a lasting resolution to thrift 
industry problems. The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows: The Early Years; Post Depression Years Through the 
1960s; The 1970s: Disintermediation and Consumerism; The 
1980s: Deregulation, Expansion, Crisis, Re-regulation; and What 
will the 1990s Bring? 
THE EARLY YEARS 
The first savings and loan institution was organized in 
1831. Its primary purpose was to finance home ownership for 
association members. At this time, commercial banks were not 
filling this need because they perceived their role as financing 
the capitalization of industry [Ewalt, 1962, p . 372]. With the 
growing industrialization of the nation and the need for housing 
for urban residents, savings and loans spread across the country 
to serve savers and home mortgage borrowers. The spread of 
the thrift industry spurred a tremendous growth in residential 
construction across the nation. This construction boom became 
a leading factor in the prosperity of the 1920s [Keith, 1973]. 
Throughout this developmental period from 1831 into the 
1920s, the institutions were chartered by states and were regu-
lated by laws which varied greatly between states. Many states 
had no requirement for the establishment of reserves against 
losses on loans; consequently, some institutions paid out essen-
tially all profits in dividends to shareholders. In addition, mort-
gage repayment arrangements frequently failed to provide for 
methodical reduction of the principal balance of loans. Mort-
gage financing arrangements too frequently involved first, sec-
ond, and third mortgages financed over periods of 10 to 15 
years. This was not a great problem while real estate prices were 
stabilized or rising with the economic boom in the stock mar-
ket. However, in 1929, the stock market crashed and real estate 
prices plummeted. 
Early in the 1930s, institutions found themselves with delin-
quent loans, foreclosures, and a bulk of repossessed real estate 
assets. With so much repossessed property for sale, even at re-
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duced prices, little property was changing hands because of a 
lack of public confidence in the real estate market and the bank-
ing industry. Furthermore, with assets that were illiquid and 
having paid out most of the profits in prior years as dividends, 
the savings and loans were in deep financial difficulty. As part 
of legislation to restore financial vitality and public confidence 
in the banking system, Congress enacted several laws aimed at 
promoting stability in the housing market and the savings and 
loan industry. Among these laws were the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Act (1932), the Home Owner's Loan Act (1933), and the 
National Housing Act (1934). Some of the major provisions of 
these laws were as follows. 
First, the Federal Home Loan Bank Act established the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System operated by the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The intent of the Act was to 
help hard pressed homeowners who could not get mortgage 
funding from banks to receive financing from a FHLB member. 
Thus, the purpose of the Board and the system was primarily to 
advance funds to Federal savings and loans so that they could 
advance the funds to homeowners. Secondarily, the Board regu-
lated those institutions participating in the funds advancement. 
This latter purpose was largely implemented in two ways. First, 
the Board took an active role in evaluating proposed laws to 
determine their effect on the financial well-being of the indus-
try, and then lobbied Congress on the thrifts' behalf. Second, 
the Board assured "that regulated institutions adhered to writ-
ten laws and regulations" [Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 109]. This 
function was a very legalistic one, which did not necessarily 
coincide with determining the financial soundness of individual 
institutions. While these provisions of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Act served to stabilize the mortgage market by making 
funds available on a regular basis, emergency funding was made 
available by the Home Owners Loan Act. 
The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 provided emergency 
mortgage funding to distressed home-owners by offering them 
long-term mortgage loans (15 year periods), with fixed interest 
rates capped at 5% initially. This Act further provided that Fed-
eral savings and loans could only lend their funds for home 
mortgages and combinations of home and business property 
mortgages; and these loans could only be made within 50 miles 
of the association's home office. Finally, the Act specifically ex-
empted Federal savings and loans from federal taxation and 
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from taxation by any state. This offered the institutions tax pro-
tection for the purpose of rebuilding their reserves. 
The third major act, The National Housing Act, established 
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to 
insure depositors at the savings associations. It also established 
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to insure savings as-
sociations against losses on mortgages and home improvement 
loans and to regulate amortization of those loans. Additionally, 
the Act established the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA or Fannie Mae) to create a secondary market for mort-
gages.3 Finally, the Act provided that each institution establish a 
reserve of 5% of deposits. Institutions were given 10 years to 
meet this goal. These three laws marked the first Federal in-
volvement in the housing industry, and reflect the national rec-
ognition of the important role of savings and loans in home 
ownership. This depression-era legislation set the framework for 
the system of federally chartered savings and loans. 
THE POST-DEPRESSION YEARS THROUGH THE 1960s 
Under this regulatory framework, the savings and loan in-
dustry returned to prosperity in the late 1930s. From then until 
the late 1960s, the institutions experienced increasing profit 
margins. This prosperity was the result of several factors includ-
ing the following. First, World War II promoted high long-term 
mortgage rates and low short-term interest payments to deposi-
tors , with rates remaining relatively stable throughout the 
1940s, 1950s and early 1960s. Second, a tremendous post-war 
prosperity was experienced across the nation. Third, the middle 
class enlarged, and society began moving to the suburbs . 
Fourth, real estate prices escalated; and, fifth, the Federal gov-
ernment established a continuing concern for housing develop-
ment [Ewalt, 1962, pp. 255-341]. This Federal concern for hous-
ing fueled savings and loan prosperity during the Post-Depres-
sion years; however, it also established the framework for the 
difficulties the industry would encounter in the 1970s, and ulti-
mately the 1980s, for the reasons detailed below. 
3Provisions of these Acts are summarized in U.S. Congress, Evolution of 
[the] Role of the Federal Government in Housing and Community Development, 
1975. 
5
Margavio: Savings and loan debacle : The culmination of three decades of conflicting regulation, deregulation, and re-regulation
Published by eGrove, 1993
6 The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1993 
Increasing Role of Federal Government in Setting Mortgage Terms 
During the post-depression years, the availability of the sec-
ondary mortgage market (through Fannie Mae) enabled institu-
tions with excess cash to participate in the prosperous mortgage 
lending in booming housing markets. However, in order for in-
stitutions to sell mortgages through Fannie Mae, the mortgages 
had to meet FHA criteria. These criteria related most notably to 
the length of the loan repayment period, the percentage of ap-
praised value eligible for loan financing (referred to as loan-to-
value ratios), and interest rate caps on the loans. Initial repay-
ment periods were 15 to 20 years, with loan-to-value ratios of 
80%. These values were changed almost annually through the 
1940s and 1950s in various Housing Acts. One of these Acts, the 
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the G.I. Bill of Rights), 
established a program of government regulated, government in-
sured loans especially for veterans. Provisions of these loans 
were similar to FHA loan provisions. The loans were adminis-
tered by the Veterans Administration (VA) and eventually be-
came known as VA loans. 
The VA and FHA loan terms at times had repayment peri-
ods extended to 40 years, and at times loan to value ratios were 
as high as 97% [Mason, 1982, p. 64], The government rationale 
for supporting such generous mortgage terms continued to be 
that "housing is a segment of the economy demanding special 
treatment to assure a flow of credit which it would not ordi-
narily attract" [Ewalt, 1962, p. 262]. This government philoso-
phy was effective in attracting capital to the mortgage market, 
primarily in the form of a growth in mortgage bankers. The 
mortgage bankers aggressively marketed FHA and VA insured 
loans with long maturities and low interest rates. They then sold 
these loans to Fannie Mae. This fierce competition from the 
mortgage bankers forced the savings and loans to make FHA 
and VA qualified loans, or, alternatively, to make conventional 
loans which closely paralleled the long repayment periods, low 
interest rates and generous loan to value ratios of the FHA 
loans. Thus, the FHA loan terms became the industry standard, 
and savings and loans began to lock themselves into 20, 30, and 
40 year loan commitments. 
Fuelled by generous FHA and VA loan terms, and FSLIC 
insurance guarantees, housing starts in the 1950s and 1960s 
reached record levels; and the savings and loan industry contin-
ued to prosper. This prosperity led to the creation of new sav-
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ings and loan institutions, and these associations were given up 
to 20 years to meet the 5% reserve requirement established in 
the National Housing Act. During this period of increasing pros-
perity for savings and loans, the institutions found their assets 
expanding in geometric proportions. At the same time, commer-
cial banks were experiencing only modest growth [Woerheide, 
1984, p. 5]. The commercial banking industry attributed the 
savings and loan prosperity to favorable tax treatment because, 
during the World War II and Post-War Era, savings and loan 
associations were not subject to federal income taxation. The 
tax policy at that time (consistent with the regulatory policy) 
was that these institutions served a vital role in financing the 
development of residential housing, an important national goal 
[Biederman and Tuccillo, 1976, p. 5]. In addition, since savings 
and loans were traditionally mutually owned, they were viewed 
as tax conduits for the depositors/owners. This preferential tax 
treatment, not available to commercial banks, was a continual 
irritant to the commercial banking industry which voiced com-
plaints about this unfair tax treatment afforded savings and 
loans. 
The Revenue Act of 1951 
Commercial banking arguments centered around the fact 
that savings and loans were in direct competition with commer-
cial banks for savings deposits; and that if savings and loans 
were to be allowed to compete with banks for deposits, they 
should be subject to equal taxation [U.S. Congress, 1951, p. 
783]. In response to these and other persuasive arguments ad-
vanced by commercial banks, the Revenue Act of 1951 amended 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to treat savings and loans as 
regular corporations.4 This Act set the framework for savings 
and loan taxation. It was significant because it signalled a shift 
in tax policy which lost some of its focus on protecting saving 
and loans because of their commitment to housing finance, and 
4Several exceptions to this general rule of taxing savings and loans as regu-
lar corporations have developed over the years. Major exceptions include: the 
percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction (discussed at length in the text 
of this paper), ordinary loss treatment from the sale of corporate and govern-
ment securities, deduction for interest incurred to carry tax-exempt bonds (pre-
Tax Reform Act of 1986) and a longer net operating loss carryback period (pre-
Tax Reform Act of 1986). These exceptions, as well as several less significant 
ones, are explained more fully by Halperin [1971] and by Clark [1975]. 
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moved towards the concept of tax equality among thrifts and 
banks competing for consumer deposits. This shift marked a 
divergence in tax policy and FHLBB regulatory policy. Although 
the tax policy shift at this time was major, the actual tax impact 
was negligible for the following reason. 
The Revenue Act of 1951, in addition to subjecting savings 
and loans to taxation for the first time, provided them a choice 
of methods for determining their allowance for bad debts. This 
allowance then determined the bad debt deduction for tax pur-
poses. Like other corporations, savings and loans could choose 
to set up their allowance based on actual bad debt experience, 
averaged over a specified period of years. In lieu of this experi-
ence method, they could choose the percentage of taxable in-
come bad debt deduction.5 This method enabled the institutions 
to write off as much as 100% of their taxable income to a re-
serve for bad debts. The balance of this reserve, together with 
earned surplus and undivided profits, was limited to 12% of 
total deposits. This limitation was, as a practical matter, seldom 
a binding constraint [U.S. Congress, 1969, p. 3514]. Thus, while 
savings and loans were nominally taxable entities, few paid any 
income tax until the passage of the Revenue Act of 1962. 
The Revenue Act of 1962 
In 1962, Congress again devoted its attention to the issue of 
savings and loan taxation. This reconsideration was initiated by 
President Kennedy's demand for a review of the taxes of "pri-
vate savings and lending institutions [that] are accorded tax de-
ductible reserve provisions which substantially reduce or elimi-
nate their Federal income tax liability" [U.S. Congress, 1961, p. 
2]. As a result of the ensuing Congressional review, the Revenue 
Act of 1962 reduced the percentage of taxable income bad debt 
deduction rate to 60% of taxable income. Subsequent to this 
change, effective tax rates of savings and loans rose (see Exhibit 
5Savings and loans could also choose a method known as the "3-percent 
method" which allowed them to set up a reserve at three percent of eligible 
loans (as defined in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939). This method became 
known in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC) as the percentage of eligible 
loans method. This method underwent few changes from 1954 to 1986 when it 
was struck from the law in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. For this reason, and 
since most of the controversy over bad debt deductions for savings and loans 
focused on the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction, this method is 
not discussed further in this paper. 
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1). The Act also added a restriction that savings and loans using 
this deduction were required to hold at least 72% of their assets 
in "qualified assets." Qualified assets included residential real 
property loans; loans secured by members' deposits or by 
church facilities; cash and U.S. government obligations; and 
property used in conduct of the institution's business [Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) section 7701(a)(19)(C)]. This was the first 
explicit linking in the tax law between the percentage of taxable 
income bad debt deduction and an institution's investment in 
mortgages. It also placed the tax law in the position of dictating 
specific investments allowable for savings and loans. This intro-
duced a conflict in allowable investments for tax and regulatory 
purposes. 
At this time, savings and loans had little choice but to ac-
cept their tax increase because the regulatory rules which speci-
fied permitted savings and loan investments were even more 
stringent than the 72% investment in qualified assets required 
for tax purposes.6 While the tax law did not specify how the 
remaining 28% of assets had to be invested, regulatory rules 
limited investments exclusively to: (1) residential mortgage 
loans on one to four-family home types, (2) loans secured by 
members' deposits, (3) cash, (4) government securities, (5) prop-
erty used in conduct of the institution's business, (6) residential 
property improvement loans (limited to 15% of total assets), or 
(7) loans on the security of improved real estate other than one 
to four-family home types (limited to 20% of total assets) [12 
CFR 545.11]. Thus, for all practical purposes, regulatory invest-
ments, other than cash, government bonds, business property, 
and loans secured by members' deposits, were committed to 
residential mortgages and improvements to residential property. 
Effectively only 20% of an institution's assets could be invested 
in anything other than residential property and related loans. 
Because of these constraints, savings and loans had to maintain 
approximately 80% of their assets invested in qualified assets to 
meet regulatory requirements. 
6Savings and loans could have expanded their investment in tax free govern-
ment bonds in order to avoid incurring a greater tax burden. Baer [1983] illus-
trates the potential benefits of this strategy. Hendershott and Koch [1980], how-
ever, present contradictory evidence showing that relative before tax returns on 
taxable and non-taxable investments would have to be in excess of their historic 
relationship to make this strategy worthwhile. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Aggregate Effective Tax Rates of 
Savings and Loan Associations, 1960-1988 
(Dollars in Millions)a 
Year Net Income Taxes Effective 
Before Taxes Tax Rate 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
$ 552 
716 
820 
764 
919 
929 
727 
711 
1,011 
1,230 
1,166 
1,748 
2,317 
2,655 
2,144 
2,082 
3,219 
4,610 
5,717 
5,198 
1,193 
-6,148 
-5,869 
2,561 
1,871 
5,951 
3,300 
-4,100 
-11,565 
$ 4 
3 
3 
93 
131 
134 
97 
95 
148 
194 
241 
434 
630 
758 
661 
634 
969 
1,412 
1,799 
1,578 
409 
-1,516 
-1,598 
593 
770 
2,112 
3,100 
2,700 
1,874 
0.7% 
0.4 
0.4 
12.2 
14.3 
14.4 
13.3 
13.2 
14.7 
15.8 
20.7 
24.8 
27.2 
28.5 
30.8 
30.5 
30.1 
30.6 
31.5 
30.4 
34.3 
N/A 
N/A 
23.2 
41.2 
35.5 
N/Ab 
N/Ab 
N/Ab 
aInformation obtained from U.S. League of Savings Institutions [1989, p. 50] 
and U.S. Congress [1983, p. 286]. 
b
 Industry-wide effective tax rates for these years are meaningless because they 
reflect a growing disparity in income between profitable and unprofitable insti-
tutions. 
Such an investment level was not a hardship for the institu-
tions during this time period because, as discussed previously, 
profit margins were relatively stable, demand was relatively 
stable, and real estate prices were rising. This was the last time 
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the industry experienced such stability. In the years following 
1961, further conflicts developed between allowable assets for 
tax and regulatory purposes, thereby sending the industry a 
mixed message on the role it was expected to play in home 
financing. Tax burdens on the industry increased; and Regula-
tion Q was imposed by regulators. The regulatory rationale for 
the implementation of Regulation Q is explained in the follow-
ing section. 
Regulation Q Imposed 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, inflation became a serious 
problem. Fuelled by the Vietnam War, which the government 
tried to finance without a major tax increase, inflation rates 
became higher and more variable than in the past [Carron, 
1982, p. 5]. The rampant inflation exerted upward pressure on 
market interest rates, which were also being driven upwards by 
competition among savings and loans in the western and east-
ern portions of the country, and between banks and savings and 
loans. 
By 1966, interest rates reached a 100 year high [Bowden 
and Holbert, 1984, p. 28]. The Federal government became con-
cerned about savings and loans' ability to pay these high interest 
rates to depositors. Since their portfolios were tied up in long-
term, fixed-rate residential mortgages, savings and loans were 
unable to make rapid adjustments in their revenue base to offset 
the rising cost of short-term borrowing (deposits). Thus, the 
industry was trapped by fixed-yield, long-term investments fi-
nanced by short-term borrowing at volatile interest rates. To 
protect the savings and loan industry, in 1966 the Federal gov-
ernment imposed Regulation Q deposit rate ceilings on savings 
and loans. This was viewed as a viable means of keeping down 
savings and loans' cost of funds and protecting the industry 
from competitive forces. Subsequent to imposition of Regula-
tion Q, market rates dropped and some observers believed that 
savings and loans were out of trouble. This belief may have 
been at least partially responsible for the imposition of addi-
tional taxes on savings and loans in the Revenue Act of 1969. 
The Revenue Act of 1969 
The Revenue Act of 1969 increased savings and loan taxes 
by reducing the percentage of taxable income limit for the bad 
11
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debt deduction. During the hearings which preceded this act, 
the savings and loan industry requested that the definition of 
qualified assets be expanded to encompass new regulatory pow-
ers.7 Regulators had expanded savings and loan allowable assets 
to include certain education loans (up to five percent of total 
assets), housing for the aging (up to five percent of total assets), 
loans on improved real estate other than residential property, 
and loans for the acquisition and development of land (raised 
from 15% to 20% of total assets) [12 CFR 545.6-545.8]. How-
ever, the industry was unable to pursue these investments be-
cause of the stringent asset restrictions of Section 7701(a)(19) of 
the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the tax law and operating regu-
lations were in conflict. 
As a partial response to industry pleas, the 1969 Act ex-
panded qualified assets to include: loans secured by commercial 
property in certain u rban renewal areas; loans secured by 
school, health, or welfare facilities; and student loans. However, 
the qualified assets percentage was increased to 82%, and a 
sliding scale implemented for investment levels from 82% to 
60%. For every one percent of an institution's portfolio which 
fell below 82%, the bad debt deduction was reduced by three-
fourths of one percent. Once the institution's portfolio fell to 
less than 60% investment in qualified assets, it could no longer 
use the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction. 
This marked the widest divergence yet in tax and regulatory 
policy. While regulators were becoming more lenient in allow-
ing institutions some limited diversification out of residential 
mortgages (up to 30% of the portfolio), the tax law was impos-
ing a tax penalty for diversification in excess of 18%. In addition 
to this constraint, the Act reduced the deduction rate from 60% 
to 40%, phased in over a 10 year period. Thus, even those insti-
tutions not diversifying experienced a tax increase.8 This tax 
increase contributed to a severe financial crunch which gripped 
the industry in the 1970s. 
7See testimony of William J. Hallahan, Consultant on Monetary Policy and 
Economic Affairs, National League of Insured Savings Associations [U.S. Con-
gress, 1969, p. 3524]. 
8See Exhibit 1 for a summary of Savings and Loans effective tax rates fol-
lowing the 1969 Act. 
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THE 1970s: DISINTERMEDIATION, CONSUMERISM AND 
NET WORTH CRISIS 
During the 1970s, a growing rate of inflation was experi-
enced across the country. This was attributed in part to the 
Federal government trying to finance the Vietnam War without 
any major tax increase, and to the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) 100% increase in oil prices. In an 
effort to curb the growing inflation problem, the Federal Re-
serve Bank increased its discount rate and its reserve require-
ments to record levels. It also implemented a new monetary 
control policy which focused on regulation of the total reserves 
of the banking system instead of regulation of short-term inter-
est rates. Subsequent to announcement of this policy, short-
term market interest rates rose rapidly. This precipitated finan-
cial chaos in the savings and loan industry. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, savings and loans were 
prevented by Regulation Q from passing these high short-term 
market interest rates on to their depositors. This situation moti-
vated depositors to withdraw funds from savings and loans in 
order to invest in alternative, higher yielding investment ve-
hicles (particularly money market mutual funds) offered by un-
regulated intermediaries. This disintermediation forced savings 
and loans to enter the market as short-term borrowers, paying 
very high interest rates on borrowed funds. Meanwhile, their 
income-generating portfolios were tied up in long-term, low in-
terest bearing, fixed-rate mortgages. This latter problem was 
largely the result of years of savings and loan responses to the 
trend in mortgage lending established by the FHA and VA, and 
the portfolio restrictions established by Congress. 
The institutions fought back against these regulations by 
circumventing them to the extent possible. Since investment op-
portunities were still largely limited to mortgages by FHLBB 
regulations, and by tax regulation, the savings and loans began 
to enhance their services. The industry expanded operations 
into costly branch networks (Exhibit 2) and other customer 
amenities, thus causing operating costs to rise. Savings and 
loans expected that these enhanced services would lure back 
customer deposits. To further lure depositors, they began offer-
ing Negotiable Orders of Withdrawal (NOW accounts) which 
were in substance interest-bearing checking accounts. This 
strategy further increased operating costs and resulted in a se-
vere profit squeeze for the industry. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
Number of Savings Institutions and Their Branch Offices, 
1960-1987a 
Year-end 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Savings Institutions Offices 
Main 
6,320 
6,185 
5,669 
5,474 
5,298 
5,170 
5,086 
4,931 
4,821 
4,761 
4,725 
4,684 
4,594 
4,298 
3,831 
3,645 
3,591 
3,535 
3,488 
3,408 
Branch 
1,611 
2,994 
4,318 
4,961 
5,851 
7,036 
8,775 
10,518 
11,908 
13,087 
14,250 
15,508 
16,733 
17,495 
18,712 
18,635 
18,812 
19,186 
19,540 
19,664 
Total 
7,931 
9,179 
9,987 
10,435 
11,149 
12,206 
13,861 
15,449 
16,729 
17,848 
18,975 
20,192 
21,327 
21,793 
22,543 
22,280 
22,403 
22,721 
23,028 
23,072 
aSource: U.S. League of Savings Institutions [1989, p . 56]. 
This profit squeeze was the beginning of the savings and 
loan debacle of the 1980s. As profits plunged, the net worth, or 
capital position, of the industry eroded making reserve require-
ments ever more difficult to maintain. This situation prompted 
the industry to pressure the Bank Board into extending its dead-
line to meet the 5% reserve requirements. In 1972, the Board 
responded by authorizing institutions to compute their reserves 
as a percentage of savings deposits averaged over a five-year 
period. As the earnings positions of the institutions continued to 
weaken, the industry trade organization, the U.S. League of Sav-
ings Institutions, petitioned Congress to reduce the reserve re-
quirements. Congress eventually did this in the Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation Act of 1980. 
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THE 1980s: DEREGULATION, EXPANSION, 
CRISIS, RE-REGULATION 
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 was the first in a series of ill 
conceived regulation attempting to repair the regulatory in-
duced damage done to the savings and loan industry in the 
1970s. The regulation of the 1980s was ill conceived for several 
reasons. First, deregulation of savings and loan liabilities (free-
ing interest rates on interest bearing deposits) preceded deregu-
lation of investments, thus exacerbating an already volatile 
earnings situation. Secondly, regulators authorized the use of 
several accounting methods which obscured the true financial 
condition of the industry. Finally, a lack of communication and 
coordination among various government regulators created a 
regulatory environment of uncertainty and confusion about the 
role the institutions were to play as financial intermediaries. 
Details of how this confusion developed follows in the discus-
sion of the regulatory events that occurred during the 1980s. 
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain Act 
The first of the regulatory changes in the 1980s, DIDMCA, 
authorized a phase out of Regulation Q deposit rate ceilings, 
thus allowing savings and loans to increase rates paid on depos-
its (liabilities). In addition, the law legitimized NOW accounts 
nationwide. Both of these provisions caused an increase in the 
institutions' cost of funds. Furthermore, the Act gave the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board the authority to vary reserves (or 
capital) requirements for individual institutions between 3% 
and 6% of deposits. The Act also granted savings and loans 
some limited freedom to diversify asset holdings including the 
ability to invest up to 3% of assets in service corporations (i.e., 
subsidiary corporations allowed to participate in a wide range 
of business activities). These asset diversification powers were 
further expanded in 1982. 
The 1982 Act, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions 
Act, allowed savings and loans to invest up to 30% of their as-
sets in consumer loans and corporate debt, up to 40% in non-
residential real estate, and up to 10% in commercial loans. In 
addition to these new investment powers, the Garn-St. Germain 
Act eliminated loan to value ratios on all loans (thus permitting 
100% financing of real estate projects); and, for the first time, 
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permitted adjustable rate mortgages. Regulators believed that, 
collectively, these 1980 and 1982 changes would enable savings 
and loans to diversify some of their long-term lending and 
short-term borrowing financial structure and better weather 
changing economic conditions in the future. 
This expectation may have proved true had the DIDMCA 
and Garn-St. Germain asset reforms been enacted a decade ear-
lier, before the devastating interest rate spread losses in the 
1970s. As it happened, upon entering the 1980s, savings and 
loan profits were at a historical low (Exhibit 1), and institutions 
may have lacked the capital to acquire investment expertise in 
many of the areas newly opened to them. Furthermore, reserves 
for some institutions were below the 3% minimum mandated by 
Congress in DIDMCA [Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 31]. Garn-St. 
Germain provided a solution to problem in the form of net 
worth certificates. 
Beginning in September, 1982, the Garn-St. Germain Act 
allowed a pseudo-capital infusion for under capitalized institu-
tions in the form of net worth certificates which the institutions 
purchased from the FSLIC. These certificates served to increase 
an institution's assets and equity for regulatory purposes, and 
basically provided for a semi-annual cash infusion to the insti-
tution by the FSLIC until such time as the institution returned 
to profitability.9 These net worth certificates were not treated as 
capital by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).10 
This became the first in a series of GAAP versus RAP (regulatory 
accounting principles) differences which obfuscated analysis of 
the financial condition of savings and loans. Other such differ-
ences were deferral of loan losses and appraised equity capital, 
discussed below. 
9Net worth certificates were recorded as Notes Receivable-FSLIC and Capi-
tal. Under the arrangement the FSLIC paid interest on these notes semiannually 
to the institution "at rates equal to the yield on FHLBB obligations plus 25 basis 
points" [Peat Marwick Main & Co., 1988, Section 19.3.3]. The institution would 
then reimburse the FSLIC at the same rate of interest, "but interest is not due 
until the institution returns to profitability" [Peat Marwick Main & Co., 1988, 
Section 19.3.2]. 
10Per GAAP, the net worth certificates were treated as an off balance sheet 
item which was to be disclosed in footnotes, although interest accruals were 
made [Peat, Marwick, Main and Co., 1988, Section 19.3.3]. 
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GAAP versus RAP 
In order to buy time for institutions to restructure their 
portfolios in response to the new investment opportunities of 
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain, the FHLBB developed a series 
of optional accounting rules designed to bolster the appearance 
of net worth. The most prominent of these became the ap-
praised equity capital provisions, and deferral of losses on the 
sale of loans.11 Appraised equity capital arose from institutions 
recording the increase in the market value of the office build-
ings which they owned and occupied. During the 1970s, some 
institutions began to build net worth by selling their buildings, 
recording the gain, and leasing the facility back from the new 
owners. From November, 1982, to December, 1986 the FHLBB 
permitted all institutions to "book" this gain in market value, 
without actually selling the premises, calling it "appraised eq-
uity capital." This non-consummated transaction was not recog-
nized by GAAP. 
In contrast to this GAAP violation, a second FHLBB regula-
tion challenged GAAP by deferring recognition of transactions 
that were consummated. This new provision allowed the defer-
ral of losses on the sale of loans. By contrast, GAAP required 
recognition of these losses. However, in order to encourage in-
stitutions to sell off low interest bearing loans, the Bank Board 
allowed any such losses to be deferred and amortized over what 
remained of the original life of the loan. This regulation was in 
effect from October, 1981 to October, 1984. These two primary 
regulatory accounting techniques constituted the most blatant 
departures from GAAP; however, other differences also devel-
oped. 
Other GAAP versus RAP differences developed because of 
aggressive interpretation of existing GAAP rules, special institu-
tion specific decisions made by the Bank Board, and a delay in 
the issuance of authoritative accounting literature by the Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Some of these in-
cluded the following. First, RAP allowed recognition of gains 
and losses on "wash sales" of securities sold and reacquired 
within a short period of time, while GAAP did not allow such 
recognition. Second, RAP allowed recognition of current in-
come from loan origination and commitment fees up to 2% of 
11Several less significant differences in GAAP and RAP which existed at this 
time are summarized in McEachern, 1986. 
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loan value, while GAAP required recognition of these fees as an 
adjustment to yield over the life of the loan using the interest 
method of amortization.12 Third, RAP allowed use of real estate 
appraisals to satisfy GAAP requirements of net present value 
computations for valuation of real estate collateral on acquisi-
tion, development and construction loans. Fourth, for certain 
mergers of troubled institutions, the FHLBB allowed goodwill 
to be amortized over an extended period of time, while GAAP 
allowed such extensions only when a substantial amount of li-
abilities acquired were long-term in nature. In addition, for cer-
tain mergers including FSLIC cash assistance, RAP treated this 
as a contribution to capital, while GAAP generally treated this 
as a deferred revenue or discount on the assets for which the 
allowance was granted.13 
Many of these GAAP verses RAP discrepancies were vehe-
mently opposed by the accounting profession because of the 
potential for creating misleading financial statements. Several 
comment letters to this effect were written by the AICPA and 
the FASB to the FHLBB, the Committee on Banking, Finance 
and Urban Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, the 
SEC, and various individual Congressmen.14 Some of the com-
ment letters were written as early as January, 1981 when the 
RAP rules were only at the proposal stage. Each letter detailed 
differences between the RAP treatment and the GAAP treatment 
(or proposed GAAP treatment), indicating the potential for dis-
tortion of an institution's capital position. The profession feared 
such distortions would then mask the true financial condition of 
the savings and loan industry. 
These concerns from the accounting profession went largely 
unheeded, as evidenced by regulators' decision to allow RAP for 
reporting purposes. Furthermore, regulators allowed each insti-
tution to choose which set of accounting rules, GAAP or RAP, to 
follow in preparing its financial statements to be filed with the 
Bank Board. Not surprisingly, those institutions adopting RAP 
12This GAAP treatment was not promulgated until issuance of Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 19, Accounting for Nonrefundable Fees and 
Costs associated with Originating or Acquiring Loans and Initial Direct Costs of 
Leases, in December, 1986. 
13Details of these four GAAP verses RAP differences are described in 
McEachern [1986, p. S-48, S-49] and Peat Marwick Main and Co. [1988, Chap-
ter 30.2 and 21]. 
14An extensive list of these communications is presented in Chenok, 1989, 
pp. 150 and 154. 
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were generally found to be the ones with lower capital ratios 
[Hill and Ingram, 1989]. Since institutions with low capital ra-
tios were in danger of violating minimum net worth require-
ments, they could have been forced to merge or liquidate. For 
such institutions, the adoption of RAP served to postpone inter-
vention by the FHLBB. This forbearance by the FHLBB has 
been cited as one of the factors contributing to the savings and 
loan debacle of the 1980s.15 
Forbearance by the FHLBB should not, however, have been 
surprising, since the Board had behaved similarly in the crisis 
of the 1970s (as discussed previously) by manipulating capital 
standards. In doing this, the Board was conforming to its origi-
nal legislative purpose established in the 1930s: to assure the 
uninterrupted flow of funds to the savings and loan industry. 
This original legislative intention assumed the primary purpose 
of savings and loans to be the supply of funds for residential 
mortgages. A broadening of the scope of the industry was, how-
ever, introduced in the new investment vehicles provided by 
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain legislation. The role of the 
FHLBB following these changes was not updated. This was only 
one of several conflicts in Congressional intent. Another conflict 
was manifest in the tax law. 
Tax Reforms in the 1980s 
The specific tax law provisions related to savings and loans 
remained virtually unchanged following DIDMCA and Garn-St. 
Germain. Despite the investment flexibility permitted under 
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain, the tax law still required sav-
ings and loans to maintain between 82% and 60% of their assets 
in qualified form (primarily residential mortgages). While still 
demanding this large commitment to residential mortgages, and 
even as industry profits sagged, tax changes made in 1982 and 
1984 served to increase the tax burden placed upon the institu-
tions. The tax changes increased the tax burden on savings and 
loans by reducing the percentage of taxable income bad debt 
deduction from 40% to 32% of taxable income.16 This deduction 
was further reduced to 8% in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
15Pilzer, P., 1989; Pizzo, S., Flicker, M. and Muolo, P., 1989; and Adams, J., 
1990 each discuss this problem at length. 
l6The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 added section 291, 
which provided that the deduction for certain preference items, including the 
bad debt reserves of savings and loans (to the extent they exceeded reserves 
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made two major changes to 
the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction. First, the 
Act eliminated the sliding scale between 82% and 60% invest-
ment in qualified assets. This effectively reduced the minimum 
required investment to 60%. This change brought tax qualified 
assets into closer alignment with regulatory allowed assets for 
the first t ime since 1969. The second change reduced the deduc-
tion percentage from 32% to 8% of taxable income. Prior to the 
passage of this provision, Congress had contemplated the com-
plete elimination of this deduction [U.S. Congress, 1983]. Thus, 
the savings and loan institutions became aware that they were 
losing their tax protection for performing their service to the 
mortgage market. At the same time, they were allowed more 
flexibility in structuring their portfolios. The message from Con-
gress was consistent at this point: diversify and become fully 
taxable financial intermediaries. Some institutions acted quickly 
to diversify. 
Expansion and Crisis 
Some savings and loans began using new investment pow-
ers granted to diversify out of residential mortgages.17 However, 
by the time these powers were granted in the 1980s, the indus-
try had a severe net worth problem. The Bank Board, anxious to 
encourage an influx of new capital into the industry, dropped a 
long standing requirement that institutions have a minimum of 
400 shareholders, with no one shareholder owning more than 
25% of the savings and loan. After this policy change, institu-
tions were eligible for 100% ownership by a single individual 
[Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 94]. This attracted a new type of 
owner/manager to the savings and loan business: mortgage bro-
computed under the experience method), be reduced by 15% of the otherwise 
allowable deduction. At the same time, the amount considered a preference for 
the minimum tax computation was reduced to 71.6% of excess reserves [IRC 
section 57(b)(1) and (2)]. Assuming that the entire percentage of taxable income 
bad debt deduction addition to the reserve was in excess of the experience 
method, the applicable rate for the deduction was reduced to 34%. Next, the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 reduced this deduction rate to 32% by increasing 
the IRC section 291 rate to 20% and also reducing the amount included in the 
minimum tax base to 59.833% of the excess. This reduced the bad debt deduc-
tion to 32% of taxable income. 
17For a summary of empirical research documenting this diversification and 
its effects on profits, see Margavio, 1990. 
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kers and land developers who saw the opportunity to capture a 
source of financing for their investments and projects. "In both 
cases, an association charter now provided them [the new own-
ers] with a lower cost and more certain source of funds than 
commercial bank borrowings" [Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 95]. 
In addit ion, the borrowings were federally insured by the 
FSLIC. 
Federal insurance of depositor accounts by the FSLIC was 
the root of a risky investment strategy undertaken by many in-
stitutions that were desperate to build their net worth. If the big 
risks paid off, then the institution and its shareholders would 
benefit, but if risky investments did not pay off, the FSLIC 
would share in the loss of a collapse of the association. Some 
institutions invested extensively in junk bonds, and others in-
creased interest rate hedging transactions to a level of gambling 
on the direction of future interest rates.18 Institutions began in-
vesting heavily in ADC (acquisition, development, and construc-
tion) loans to fund the commercial and residential real estate 
development activity of the new owner.19 
In order to attract funds to finance this activity, some insti-
tutions began offering interest rate premiums to depositors. 
This attracted a substantial amount of deposits from brokers 
outside of the institution's geographic area. Savings and loans 
were limited to obtaining 5% of deposits from this source. How-
ever, in March 1982, the restriction was removed by the Bank 
Board and billions of dollars flowed out of money market funds 
and into thrifts [Strunk and Case, p. 91, 92]. Institutions using 
brokered deposits began to grow at a phenomenal pace, further 
fuelling real estate development activity.20 
Some thrifts became so extensively involved in funding real 
estate development activities of certain developers that the insti-
tutions became, in substance, equity partners. This was particu-
larly true in the case of ADC loans. Accounting rules during this 
t ime allowed such loans to be classified as loans rather than 
direct investments, obscuring the true relationship between the 
18Pilzer [1989] describes this strategy in Chapter 5, "The Gamblers," pp. 
123-135; and in chapter 6, "The Man With the Lucky Coin," pp. 136-149. 
19Pilzer [1989] describes this strategy in Chapter 4, "The Cowboys," pp. 80-
122. 
20Many institutions were growing at rates faster than 25% per year [Pilzer, 
1989, p. 174]. 
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institution and the developer.21 In addition, many fraudulent ap-
praisals were obtained to value the collateral land. In the early 
1980, this problem was not discovered because real estate prices 
continued to rise. This spurred another problem. Some institu-
tions became careless in granting credit to applicants under the 
assumption that if the loan went bad, increasing property values 
would cover the losses. Problems with these strategies surfaced 
in the Southwest beginning in late 1985 and early 1986 when a 
drop in oil prices caused a major economic recession. This was 
followed by a substantial decline in real estate prices; a problem 
which spread nationwide with the spread of the recession. In 
addi t ion, by 1985 many markets began to show signs of 
overbuilding as office vacancies rose.22 This condition was ag-
gravated by 1986 tax changes which eliminated many tax ben-
efits for real estate ownership.23 Consequently, the number of 
failing institutions began to rise (Exhibit 3). 
Both the FHLBB and the FSLIC were aware of the problem. 
They were, however, prevented from acting quickly to close the 
institutions because of a severely outdated regulatory structure 
and purpose. The historical purpose of the FHLBB examiners 
was to check for compliance with government regulations. This 
required little training since substantial regulatory changes were 
not often made. Consequently, examiner positions were filled by 
low level civil service employees. Examiners merely reported 
their findings to the Washington Office of the FHLBB; the ex-
aminers could not require establishment of reserves for loan 
losses, and had no other enforcement powers. Enforcement 
powers rested with the supervisory branch of the Federal Home 
21Subsequent to the publicizing of some of the thrift industry problems, the 
Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the AICPA issued (in February, 
1986) a "Notice to Practitioners - ADC arrangements." This notice clarified strin-
gent rules which must be met for classification of ADC loans as loans. Those 
arrangements not meeting the rules were required to be shown as equity invest-
ments. [Peat Mar-wick Main and Co., 1988, Chapter 6]. 
22The overbuilding was largely a result of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 which gave special tax breaks for investing in real estate. Investors seeking 
tax deductions formed highly leveraged tax shelter partnerships which overbuilt 
the real estate market. The leverage used in these real estate partnerships came 
in part from the savings and loan industry. 
23These tax changes include passive investment loss limitations for invest-
ments in real estate; change in depreciation computations; at risk rules applied 
to real estate investment; investment interest limitations; and capital gains 
changes. 
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EXHIBIT 3 
Failures of FSLIC-Insured Institutionsa 
Year Number Assets 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
1980 11 $ 1,457.6 
1981 28 11,553.4 
1982 74 20,202.9 
1983 55 19,741.8 
1984 27 6,000.4 
1985 49 18,441.3 
1986 85 31,620.5 
1987 71 20,918.1 
aSource: Strunk and Case, 1988, pp. 8, 9. 
Loan Bank which consisted of the president and a small staff at 
the regional FHLB level. This structure created delays in com-
munications of problems and further delay in corrective action. 
Once communicat ion difficulties were overcome and a 
problem institution identified, the first step in taking action was 
for the regional FHLB to obtain a "consent decree." In this 
agreement, the thrift management would voluntarily discon-
tinue specified transactions. If this failed, "cease and desist" or-
ders and management removal requests were sought. These 
could only be issued by the Washington Office. They were diffi-
cult to obtain because they could be challenged in court, and 
required additional evidence of wrongdoing. Despite these 
shortcomings, the system worked until the deregulation of the 
1980s added complexities to the business. 
With the proliferation of new investments allowed in the 
1980s, rapid market changes in the late 1970s, and the expan-
sion of branch networks, the FHLBB examination staff was 
overextended and undertrained as to potential problems. Ex-
aminations of the institutions took more time and were con-
ducted less frequently as problems mounted. Then the stories of 
the famous failures surfaced.24 The FHLBB petitioned Congress 
24The Empire Savings and Loan of Mesquite, Texas scandal become public 
information in 1983 when the owners became the subjects of an extensive FBI 
investigation for fraud, conspiracy and racketeering in various land flip deals 
[Pilzer, 1989, p . 115]. American Savings of Stockton, California received public 
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to tighten the regulatory reins to give the FHLBB power to act 
more quickly in "cease and desist" cases, and to provide funds 
to the FSLIC so that it could absorb projected losses from clos-
ing problem institutions. 
Re-regulation 
Congress responded with the Competitive Equality Banking 
Act (CEBA) of 1987, the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery 
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989, and the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 
1991. These Acts provided a much needed infusion of funds 
(approximately $177 billion) to the FSLIC; and established the 
Resolution Trust Corporation, a temporary entity, to dispose of 
the assets of failed institutions. The Acts also changed the sav-
ings and loan regulatory structure by abolishing the FHLBB 
system. The FHLBB supervisory and examination functions 
were turned over to the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) [Sav-
ings Institutions, 1989, p. 32]. Responsibilities of the OTS were 
designed with greater emphasis on assessing the financial vi-
ability and asset quality of institutions. Thus, responsibilities 
more closely paralleled those of the Office of Controller of the 
Currency, the banking industry supervisory agency. The OTS 
was also given greater autonomy in requiring operating changes 
for, and ultimately, shutting down institutions judged to have 
too many risky investments. 
In order for the OTS to perform this function effectively, 
objective measures of riskiness had to be established. A system 
of risk determination was structured for both individual assets, 
and for an institution's entire portfolio of assets. This system 
recognizes a strong connection between the quality of an 
institution's assets, individually and collectively, and how that 
quality improves or deteriorates the institution's capital posi-
attention in 1984 when regulators forced out the CEO for betting wrong on 
interest rate swings and masking bad real estate loans [Pilzer, 1989, p. 216-219]. 
Vernon Savings and Loan of Dallas, Texas entered receivership in 1987 when 
96% of its real estate loans were deemed worthless [Adams, 1990, p. 47]. Lin-
coln Savings and Loan of Irvine, California became a much publicized scandal 
in 1987 when news of its fraudulent real estate deals and ties to the "Keating 
Five" were revealed [Adams, 1990, p. 252]. Columbia Savings and Loan of 
Beverly Hills, California, and Franklin Savings Association of Ottawa, Kansas 
were exposed in 1988 for their huge portfolios of junk bonds and their relation-
ship with Michael Milken [Pilzer, 1989, p. 136-149]. 
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tion. Definitions of risk are, therefore, cast in terms of mini-
m u m capital standards required to sustain the institution's in-
vestment in certain types of assets. The definitions and capital 
requirements were borrowed largely from the three tier capital 
standards system used by the Office of Controller of the Cur-
rency. A brief overview of the composition of these tiers is pre-
sented below. 
Tier one, core capital (or leverage capital), is defined as the 
sum of common stockholders' equity and noncumulative pre-
ferred stockholders' equity; plus identifiable intangibles (exclud-
ing goodwill and limited to 25% of total core capital); plus pur-
chased mortgage servicing rights. Savings and loans must main-
tain this core capital at a level of 3% of total assets. In addition, 
a second tier, defined as tangible capital, must be maintained at 
a level of 1.5% of total assets. Tangible capital is defined as core 
capital (tier one) minus all intangible assets. Finally, tier three, 
known as risk-based capital standards, requires institutions to 
maintain reserves of 6% of risk-weighted assets and to increase 
this percentage for interest rate fluctuations that adversely af-
fect earnings [Savings Institutions, 1989, p. 32; 12CFR Ch.V Part 
567]. Each major category of assets is given a risk weighting 
factor which is multiplied by the dollar amount of assets in that 
category.25 These risk factors are changed as market conditions 
dictate. There is a gradual phase in period until January 1, 1993 
for the risk-based standards. As the standards are designed, sav-
ings and loans must meet the minimum capital criteria in each 
of the three tiers. 
These standards are monitored by the OTS as savings and 
loans file the required quarterly financial statements. Effective 
January 1, 1994, these statements must be stated on a GAAP 
basis [Bush and Morrall, 1989, p. 30]. In addition to this return 
to GAAP accounting, the independent auditor now has a greater 
role in assessing institutional safety and soundness in the fol-
lowing ways.26 First, institutions with over $150 million in assets 
are required to obtain annual audits. Second, in addition to 
traditional GAAP and GAAS (generally accepted auditing stan-
25For example, Goodwill is generally given a 200% risk weight, thereby re-
quiring a 12% reserve. Mortgage backed securities are given a 20% risk weight, 
thereby requiring a 3% reserve. Cash and federal government backed securities 
have a 0% weight, thus requiring no reserves. 
26These provisions are summarized in Journal of Accountancy, March, 1992, 
p. 17. 
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dards) responsibilities, the audit report must comply with any 
additional disclosures that regulations require. For example, a 
separate report must be prepared attesting to management as-
sertions that the institution is in compliance with regulations 
related to safety and soundness. Third, outside auditors must 
agree to provide workpapers to regulators upon request, and 
must notify the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
if the auditor's services terminate. Finally, the FDIC may require 
that an institution's quarterly financial statements be subject to 
CPA review procedures. This authority of the FDIC stems from 
its new responsibility as the insuring agency for savings and loans. 
In a massive reorganization of the insurance system, FSLIC 
merged into the FDIC, the insuring agency for commercial 
banks. This facilitated coordination of insurance goals, rates, 
and supervision philosophy between the thrift and banking in-
dustries. By shifting the insuring of savings and loans and by 
the creation of the Office of Thrift Supervision, Congress imple-
mented a policy of regulatory equality for savings and loans and 
commercial banks. 
As the recent restructuring of savings and loans suggests, 
the banking industry has been successful in its long time urging 
of parity between the banking and thrift industries. Since 1951, 
the Commercial banking industry lobbied for tax equality be-
tween banks and savings institutions.27 These arguments were 
reiterated in hearings related to changes implemented in the 
percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction in the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. Bankers perceived these 1986 changes to be 
a move towards tax equality. In addition, arguments in the tax 
hearings acknowledged that the deregulation Acts of 1980 and 
1982 (DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain) were perceived by both 
industries to be regulatory moves towards establishing invest-
ment equalities. Thus, a trend had developed towards increasing 
equality between banks and savings and loans. The regulatory 
equalities implemented in CEBA, FIRREA, and FDICIA could be 
viewed as the culmination of this equality movement, with one 
27Banks perceived the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction to 
be the single greatest advantage afforded by the tax law to savings and loans 
over commercial banks. In virtually every major tax hearing that opened discus-
sion of this deduction (see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, 1951, 1961, 1969, and 1986 and U.S. Congress, Senate, 1983), the bank-
ing industry lobbied for its elimination in order to allow more equitable compe-
tition between the two industries. 
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major exception which now subjects savings and loans to invest-
ment restrictions not required of banks. 
The recent legislation implemented a new qualified thrift 
lender (QTL) test which restricts savings and loans to investing 
70% of their portfolio assets in qualified assets. The definition 
of qualified assets is limited to mortgages and home equity 
loans, mortgage backed securities, and construction loans. Up 
to 15% of these qualified assets can include: investments in ser-
vice corporations; loans to churches, schools, nursing homes 
and hospitals; and consumer and education loans (limited to 5% 
of portfolio assets) [Savings Institutions, 1989, p. 33]. Portfolio 
assets are defined as total tangible assets reduced by fixed assets 
and liquid assets. These definitions impose limitations on the 
investment freedom of savings and loans which are even more 
severe than the pre-1980 limitations. These restrictions have 
been criticized by the industry as being almost vindictive [Wil-
son, 1990, p. 22]. 
This QTL test constituted a very significant change in the 
three most recent laws which is contrary to the trend towards 
equality among competing financial institutions. It serves to 
force savings and loans to specialize in mortgages by restricting 
other investment activity. At the same time, FHLB membership 
was opened up to banks and credit unions; and commercial 
banks obtained the authority to acquire savings institutions. 
These latter regulatory changes further expanded the operating 
capabilities of banks and credit unions by giving them greater 
access to housing funds. These financial intermediaries can now 
compete with savings and loans for mortgages, and obtain opti-
mally diversified portfolios. However, savings and loans are now 
statutorily prohibited from diversifying extensively. This situa-
tion may lead to a devaluation in the savings and loan charter in 
the future. 
WHAT WILL THE 1990s BRING? 
This devaluation has been predicted by some experts 
[McLean, 1991; Jacobe, 1990; Savings Institutions, 1990]. They 
argue that as a result of the 1980s debacle, savings and loans 
have a bad image problem to overcome. A viable way of over-
coming this problem may be simply to change over from a sav-
ings and loan charter to a savings bank or commercial bank 
charter. Such a trend has already been observed in California 
savings and loans [Savings Institutions, 1990, p . 31] and institu-
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tions formed after 1988 [Savings Institutions, 1990, p. 5]. This 
leads some commentators to predict the demise of the tradi-
tional savings and loan institution. 
The function of the traditional savings and loan, making 
mortgage loans and holding them to maturity, is perhaps out-
dated. This conclusion rests primarily on the burgeoning sec-
ondary mortgage market which was developed and promoted by 
government sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae. This 
agency (and others like it) buys mortgages and repackages them 
into mortgage backed securities which are sold on the open 
market with varying maturities. Such securities are popular 
with investors because of a perceived federal guarantee. This 
has created an adequate supply of capital to the housing market 
despite the savings and loan crisis (see comments by Alfred A. 
Dellibova, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury in Mortgage Bank-
ing, 1991, p. 31). It has also served to integrate housing financ-
ing into the nation's overall capital market. 
This development of the real estate loan marketplace may 
eventually usurp the traditional function of the savings and loan 
industry. However, some industry observers still see the need 
for a strong consumer-oriented banking industry which would 
include mortgage financing and some other types of consumer 
financing. In addition, as the economy improves and investors 
seek investment opportunities with higher returns, they may re-
treat from the mortgage backed security market. The savings 
and loan industry then may acquire a new function in the capi-
tal market, that of buying and holding to maturity mortgage 
backed securities. 
A type of specialization strategy similar to this has been 
observed by some empiricists [Kaplan, 1988; Rudolph, 1988]. 
However, its effect on profitability has not been demonstrated 
consistently. Ultimately, carving out a market niche of some 
kind may be the key to continued viability of savings and loans, 
as well as other financial intermediaries. Thus, all financial in-
termediaries could focus on their managerial strengths in struc-
turing a strategy anywhere from specializing in housing finance, 
to consumer lending, to becoming a completely "diversified fi-
nancial supermarket" [McLean, 1991]. Such specialization deci-
sions would then rest with management instead of Congress, 
and the industry as a whole could be more responsive to market 
changes. This flexibility could be effected by regulatory changes 
allowing a universal charter for financial intermediaries. This 
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development, with corresponding adjustments in the tax law, 
would be an appropriate culmination to the 1980s piecemeal 
trend toward equality. It would also assist Congress in synchro-
nizing its goals for the financial services industry. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Congress has made major progress in the 
1980s in equalizing the regulatory structure of the financial ser-
vices industry. The savings and loan industry benefited from 
these changes by becoming better able to respond to changing 
market conditions. Many of these changes were, however, over-
due corrections of poor legislation in the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s. Those regulations (specifically the imposition of Regula-
tion Q, tax and regulatory portfolio restrictions, and overly gen-
erous loan-to-value ratios and mortgage terms) set the stage for 
the crisis the industry encountered in the late 1970s. The 
disintermediation crisis of the 1970s led to a severe net worth 
problem from which the industry was not given the opportunity 
to recover until DIDMCA, Garn-St. Germain and the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986. This net worth problem was a driving force in 
many of the irregularities that developed in the industry during 
the 1980s. Better timing and coordination of the diversification 
opportunities afforded by DIDMCA, Garn-St. Germain and the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, combined with the FIRREA structural 
changes have reduced these irregularities. Attention to these 
past policy changes, however, is only useful in understanding 
the problems of today and for examining needed future policy 
changes. 
In planning for the future, Congress must recognize that 
market conditions have integrated the housing finance function 
into the overall capital market structure. Therefore, designing a 
future for the savings and loan industry must involve a process 
of setting policy goals for the entire financial services industry. 
Legislation in the 1980s moved in the direction of equalizing 
opportunities for the thrift and banking sectors of the financial 
services industry. However, it stopped short of full equalization 
and a definitive policy statement. Once an integrated policy goal 
is established, legislators can then structure tax considerations, 
supervisory functions and other regulations to achieve these 
goals, while at the same time allowing the institutions the flex-
ibility to respond to ever changing market conditions. 
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